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2026-03Title: Information, Asset Price Volatility, and LiquiditySpeaker: Vivian Zheng from UC Santa CruzTime: 9:30-11:00 am on Mar 14th (Sat)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311；Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2026-03Title: When Al Writes Alike: Implications for Efficiency on Matching PlatformsSpeaker: Jingman Cao from National University of SingaporeTime: 3:30-5:00 pm on Mar 4th (Wed)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311；Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2026-03Title: Fair CooperationSpeaker: Andis Sofianos from Durham UniversityTime: 3:30-5:00 pm on Mar 3rd (Tue)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311；Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2026-03Title: They See the Same Value-Then Disagree:LLM choices hinge on model-specific biasSpeaker: Goette Lorenz from National University of SingaporeTime: 3:00-5:30 pm on Mar 2nd (Mon)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311；Zoom:358 796 8349
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2026-01Title: Behavioral Personalization and Algorithmic Explainability: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Robo-AdvisingSpeaker: Li Qin from Peking UniversityTime: 3:30-5:00 pm on Jan 27th (Tue)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311；Zoom:358 796 8349
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2026-01Title: Risk and Time Preferences of Couples in a General PopulationSpeaker: YOO Hong Il from Loughborough UniversityTime: 3:30-5:00 pm on Jan 26th (Mon)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311；Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2026-01IES Mechanism Design Workshop will be organized by the【center for Intelligence Economic Science (IES) • 智慧经济科学研究中心】at SWUFE on Jan 6-7,2026. We envisage the workshop as a platform for scholars to exchange ideas and collaborate on advancing research with a mechanism design focus. The conference is open to all approaches and modalities, encouraging diverse perspectives.
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2025-12Title: Beliefs about Choice ReversalsSpeaker: Alexander Coutts from York UniversityTime: 4:00-5:30 pm on Dec 9th (Tue)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311；Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2025-11Symposium for Theory and Experiment will be organized by the【center for Intelligence Economic Science (IES) • 智慧经济科学研究中心】at SWUFE on Nov 29-30,2025. We envisage the symposium as a platform for scholars to exchange ideas and collaborate on advancing research with a decision theory, mechanism design, and experiment focus. The conference is open to all approaches and modalities, encouraging ...
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2025-10Title: Unambiguous Efficiency of Random AllocationsSpeaker: Vikram Manjunath from University of OttawaTime: 15:00-16:30 pm on Octo 20th (Monday)Onsite: Hong Yuan 311Abstract: When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents’ rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment,...
