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2026-03Title: Information, Asset Price Volatility, and LiquiditySpeaker: Vivian Zheng from UC Santa CruzTime: 9:30-11:00 am on Mar 14th (Sat)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311;Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2026-03Title: When Al Writes Alike: Implications for Efficiency on Matching PlatformsSpeaker: Jingman Cao from National University of SingaporeTime: 3:30-5:00 pm on Mar 4th (Wed)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311;Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2026-03Title: Fair CooperationSpeaker: Andis Sofianos from Durham UniversityTime: 3:30-5:00 pm on Mar 3rd (Tue)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311;Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2026-03Title: They See the Same Value-Then Disagree:LLM choices hinge on model-specific biasSpeaker: Goette Lorenz from National University of SingaporeTime: 3:00-5:30 pm on Mar 2nd (Mon)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311;Zoom:358 796 8349
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2026-01Title: Behavioral Personalization and Algorithmic Explainability: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Robo-AdvisingSpeaker: Li Qin from Peking UniversityTime: 3:30-5:00 pm on Jan 27th (Tue)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311;Zoom:358 796 8349
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2026-01Title: Risk and Time Preferences of Couples in a General PopulationSpeaker: YOO Hong Il from Loughborough UniversityTime: 3:30-5:00 pm on Jan 26th (Mon)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311;Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2025-12Title: Beliefs about Choice ReversalsSpeaker: Alexander Coutts from York UniversityTime: 4:00-5:30 pm on Dec 9th (Tue)Hybrid: Hong Yuan 311;Zoom: 358 796 8349
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2025-10Title: Unambiguous Efficiency of Random AllocationsSpeaker: Vikram Manjunath from University of OttawaTime: 15:00-16:30 pm on Octo 20th (Monday)Onsite: Hong Yuan 311Abstract: When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents’ rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment,...
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2025-09Title: AI Transparency Paradox: When Medical AI Explanations Help and When They HarmSpeaker: WEI Lijia from Wuhan UniversityTime: 15:30-17:00 pm on Sept 23rd (Tuesday)Onsite: Hong Yuan 311Abstract: We document a fundamental trade-off in algorithmic transparency: explanations for AI recommendations improve decision-making when algorithms are correct but systematically harm it when they err. Using a ...
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2025-09Title: Behavioral Incentive Compatibility of the Preference Elicitation MechanismsSpeaker: SOHN Jin-yeong from Dongbei University of Finance and EconomicsTime: 10:00-11:30 am on Sept 1st (Monday)Onsite: Hong Yuan 311Abstract: We propose a test of behavioral incentive compatibility (BIC) of preference elicitation mechanisms, obvious monotonicity (OM). Applying this to Oprea's (2024a) "mirror" experiment ...