主讲人：Jiwei Zheng

题目：Player labels in tacit bargaining games - two experiments

时间：2025年4月18日，下午4:00-5:00

线下地点：弘远楼311室

线上链接：Tencent Meeting: https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/PIzpvXoRckBh (meeting Id: 270-533-829)

摘要：

Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling proposed that bargainers can coordinate their expectations on one of the equilibria in a tacit bargaining game—referred to as the “focal point” of the game—by relying on their shared understanding of payoff-irrelevant aspects of the context. This study reports two experiments investigating how player labels (i.e., irrelevant but commonly recognised characteristics of the bargainers themselves) influence behaviour in tacit bargaining games. Our results show that when players are labelled as “male” and “female,” or as “king” and “duke,” their behaviour in these games changes systematically. We conclude that player labels can significantly affect behaviour in tacit bargaining games and should therefore be taken into account when analysing individuals’ behaviour in strategic situations.