主讲人：Jin-yeong Sohn

题目：Behavioral Incentive Compatibility of the Preference Elicitation Mechanisms

时间：2025年9月1日，上午10:00-11:30

线下地点：弘远楼311室

摘要：

We propose a test of behavioral incentive compatibility (BlC) of preference elicitation mechanisms, obvious monotonicity (OM). Applying this to Oprea's (2024a)“mirror" experiment-intended to challenge the behavioral foundations of risk preferences-we show that the elicitation method itself violates BlC. First, we show that simplicity equivalent elicitation fails OM: 55% of subjects assign a lower value to 90 boxes of $25 than to 10 boxes of $25. Second, the original mirror anomalies are primarily driven by the random choices of subjects who violate OM. Third, among those who satisfy OM, simplicity equivalents are much closer to expected values. In light of the evidence, we propose that simplicity equivalents can serve as a test of BlC in future experiments.